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Abstract - Cross-border equity and long-term debt securities portfolio investment networks are analysed from 2002 to 2012,
covering the 2008 global financial crisis. They serve as network-proxies for measuring the robustness of the global financial
system and the interdependence of financial markets, respectively. Two early-warning indicators for financial crises are identi-
fied: First, the algebraic connectivity of the equity securities network, as a measure for structural robustness, drops close to zero
already in 2005, while there is an over-representation of high-degree off-shore financial centres among the countries most-related
to this observation, suggesting an investigation of such nodes with respect to the structural stability of the global financial system.
Second, using a phenomenological model, the edge density of the debt securities network is found to describe, and even forecast,
the proliferation of several over-the-counter-traded financial derivatives, most prominently credit default swaps, enabling one to
detect potentially dangerous levels of market interdependence and systemic risk.
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1 Introduction
Since the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC’08), there has been growing awareness of the interdependence of international finan-
cial markets and the systemic risk, i.e. the probability of a system-wide failure, resulting from their intrinsic entanglement [1]. It
was shown how even supposedly minor distress of individual actors in a network of major financial institutions could lead to the
annihilation of large economic value [2]. Conventional macroeconomic models, such as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
models [3, 4, 5], which assume the existence of a stable equilibrium with disturbing shocks coming from outside the system,
failed to predict, or even describe, the GFC’08.
According to the current understanding [1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10], the proliferation of certain financial products prior to the GFC’08, such
as collateralised mortgage obligations and credit default swaps (CDS), has led to a global network of strong interdependence of
financial institutions with its geographical center in the United States (US). The crisis was then triggered by a relatively small
shock inside the US mortgage market, which spread globally over this network [11], leading to a dry-up of inter-bank lending.
Subsequently, this resulted in the actual crisis, putting many systematically important institutions at risk [2]. While it is estimated
that the US banking sector suffered losses of about 1.8 trillion USD [9], the value of global financial assets declined by around
16 trillion USD [12], not taking into account knock-on effects generated by this decline. Thus, the GFC’08, originating from
a destabilising internal shock, which propagated over a complex network of strong interactions. This scenario is exactly in the
realm of network science.
The study of large-scale economic networks has seen considerable progress in recent years, as demonstrated by [13, 14, 15, 16,
17]. However, much of the data relevant to the detailed investigation of global inter-institutional networks are deemed strategi-
cally important for the involved institutions, and are not available. On the other hand, actual macroscopic dependencies among
actors in international financial markets, such as the involvement of whole economies and the macroscopic interplay between
different sectors of the global financial system may be probed by means of proxy networks, using aggregated flows/positions on
the inter-economy level.
Motivated by this observation, we investigate two types of cross-border portfolio investment networks (PIN), namely equity- (E)
and long-term debt (LD) securities, which represent major components of international capital markets. The respective networks
are labelled LD-PIN and E-PIN, where nodes are given by individual countries and directed and weighted edges by consolidated
investment positions, measured in USD, originating from residents/institutions in one country to residents/institutions in another
[18]. Details about data and the used methodologies can be found in the sections Methodology and Discussion. The main figures
and table are given in ppendix 1] and ppendix 2], respectively. A presentation of the relevant concepts of graph theory, as well as
additional information on both networks and results, are provided in the ppendix 3: Supplementary Information].
The GFC’08 is clearly reflected in both PIN, where an overall reduction in investment positions (contraction) is observed, fol-
lowed by a re-bounce as early as 2010. Our analysis reveals two early-warning indicators for potential financial crises. On the
one hand, the algebraic connectivity of the E-PIN, interpreted as an indicator for the structural robustness of the global financial
system and, as such, for the world-economy, drops sharply as early as 2005. This observation is associated with the emergence
of a sparsely connected group of countries, particularly involving Middle Eastern countries, the United Kingdom (UK) and
several high-degree off-shore financial centres (OFC), where we detect a general over-representation of OFC among countries
associated with this structural instability. On the other hand, the edge density of the LD-PIN, as a network-proxy to measure
the interdependence of financial markets, scales with the total market values of several over-the-counter-traded (OTC-traded)
financial derivative products, which have been directly linked to the crisis, such as CDS [19, 20, 9], but also equity-linked deriva-
tives (ELD). Based on this, a simple phenomenological model is introduced, which allows for the description of the proliferation
of such derivative products and, as such, for the detection of potentially high levels of market interdependency. We propose a
dynamic monitoring mechanism which, taking the GFC’08 as a testing ground, generates clear warning signals between 6-12
months ahead of the crisis.
2 Results
2.1 General Properties of PIN and the GFC’08
Both PIN are rapidly growing in terms of the numbers of nodes N and edges M in the years before the GFC’08, as can be seen
in Fig. 1, where all quantities are shown with respect to their year-2002 values (dotted reference line). A summary of network
statistics in given in App. 3: S-1. For both the E- and the LD-PIN, basic network parameters scale with major macroeconomic
quantities. Taking into account the very different time resolutions of data points, the number of edges in the E-PIN (a) tracks
quite well global stock market indices, such as the S&P Global1200 [21, 22]. The initial mismatch can be explained through the
previous burst of the“dot-com bubble” and the following mild recession, which affected mainly the US [23]. In addition, the total
trade volume between PIN countries scales roughly with the volume of the E-PIN, as shown in App. 3: S-5. Since stock markets,
which the E-PIN is inherently connected to, and international trade are widely accepted measures for economic performance, the
E-PIN offers a network-proxy for measuring the state of the world economy.
For the LD-PIN, the temporal evolution of the edge density ρLDp at the minimal percolation edge threshold (see section Method-
ology) mirrors qualitatively the evolution of gross-market value (GMV) of OTC-traded ELD, as well as the notional outstanding
amount (NOA) of CDS [24], which is shown in panel (b) ofFig. 1.
The prices/values of financial derivatives are linked to an underlying asset, such as a stock, debt security or commodity,
which by definition creates market interdependences, while their primarily uses are risk management (hedging) and specula-
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tion [19, 20, 9, 25]. The value of ELD is derived from the price of some stock or a stock index. As such, ELD provide an indirect
link between the two PIN, where it is believed that cross-asset hedges and capital structure arbitrage trades are the most important
drivers [26, 20]. Surprisingly, the inter-connectedness between equity and debt markets created in this way has so far not attracted
any attention, but might complement the understanding of the GFC’08. One reason for this could be the large variety of ELD,
such as single- or multi-stock and index forwards, options and swaps, where the macroscopic impact of individual products is
difficult to assess.
Debt securities can be traded before the borrowed amount (principal) is repaid, i.e. before their maturity, or be used as base assets
for financial derivative products such as CDS. These are credit derivative products, where the credit exposure from one or several
third parties is passed from the buyer to the seller. This activity is expected to lead to additional inter-connectedness between a
larger number of debtors and creditors. The general understanding is that CDS played an important role in transmitting the shock
from the 2007-US subprime mortgage crisis, through large insurers, to the international banking system [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 19]. These
observations make the LD-PIN a suitable network-proxy to measure the inter-connectedness and, consequently, the interdepen-
dence of financial markets, which have been identified as major factors contributing to financial crises [27].
Note that NOA and GMV of financial derivative products are interpreted as two different risk measures. NOA describes the
market value with respect to the underlying base assets (face value), such as mortgages, bonds or stocks. It may be taken as a
measure for the overall market interconnectedness/interdependence, while it does not represent the actual amount at risk. GMV
is the cost to replace existing contracts at the current market rate, which may be less coupled to the underlying assets than to the
prevailing economic environment. It is seen to be a better (short-term) risk indicator than NOA.
Figure 2 illustrates structural properties of both PIN in terms of their cumulative distributions of node strength (a, b) and eigen-
vector centrality Cev (c, d). These two measures evaluate a country’s importance within both networks from different points of
view. Node strength, which is the sum of all in-coming and out-going investment positions, measures the size of a country in a
network, while eigenvector centrality is a recursive measure, which accounts for a country’s embedding into the weighted and
directed network topology (see App. 3: S-1 for more information on both measures).
An interesting feature of both PIN is the strong hierarchical structure, as depicted by their node strength distributions. These can
be classified as being “super-heavy-tailed”, in the sense that node strengths span several orders of magnitude, while there is an
O (1)-probability for most values.
We see that the E-PIN is strongly dominated by the US and to a minor degree by the UK during all times, which is especially true
for the eigenvector centrality (see Fig. 2-c). Its wave-like structure indicates a multi-layered topology with the US at the center.
Taken together, such a configuration renders the E-PIN fragile against shocks originating from its most central nodes [28].
Both measures are more homogeneously distributed in the LD-PIN (see Figs. 2-b and -d), where the most central nodes are Japan,
France, the US and Germany. The proliferation of ELD, as shown in Fig. 1-b, is now interpreted as an additional (geographical)
shift of weight from the LD-PIN to the E-PIN, and towards the US. This can be understood as follows. Given the observed
relation between ELD and the edge density of the LD-PIN, a high centrality of countries in Europe and Asia in the LD-PIN links
them to the E-PIN, where the US is the dominating country. This configuration is expected to amplify shocks, as for example
those from the US subprime mortgage crises of 2007.
Next, we will investigate how the GFC’08 is reflected in both PIN. PIN are large-scale economic structures. The total volume
contained in all PIN together, which includes short-term debt (SD) securities, is of the same order in magnitude as world-GDP
(gross-domestic product, [29]; see blue line in Fig. 3-a), peaking at approximately 56% of world-GDP at the beginning of 2008.
The crisis leads to an overall contraction of both networks, with the total volume reduced to less than 45% of world-GDP, and a
partly re-bounce to pre-crisis levels as early as 2010.
Both effects are stronger in the E-PIN, which experiences a faster growth and larger contraction, than the LD-PIN before and
during the crisis. About 80% of the total contraction during the crisis result from the E-PIN, which shrinks by about 47% (or
10trillion USD) from 2008-2009. Note, at this point, that the contraction of both PIN already captures a large part of the decrease
in value of global financial assets resulting from the GFC’08 [12].
The higher variability of the E-PIN during the GFC’08 is attributed to the volatile nature of its links as compared to those of the
LD-PIN. This is due to the fact that investment in equity is generally riskier than investment in long-term debt. Equity securities
can be readily sold in a crisis, additionally experiencing dramatic changes in value (here, edge weight). This is not the case for
long-term debt securities, where links are by definition more durable with fixed weights, since future returns on investment are
generally determined at the time of issuance. Moreover, there has been a reduction of liquidity in the debt markets [30], as a
consequence of the crisis, which prevented the LD-PIN from contracting substantially.
Besides an overall expansion of both networks, we observe a gradual shift from debt markets to equity markets in the years before
the GFC’08 [12], which is reflected in a changing composition of the total PIN, as seen in Fig. 3-b, where the temporal evolution
of the respective fractions of volume of the total PIN (blue line in Fig. 3-a) contained in the E- and LD-PIN are shown. This is
interpreted as a growing fragility of the global financial system because the E-PIN is more susceptible to financial crises than
the LD-PIN. We remark that the strong anti-correlation between E- and LD-PIN volumes is expected because they represent the
majority of cross-border portfolio investment, as reported in [18].
A simple network measure for the structural robustness of the E-PIN against edge or node failures (removals) is the algebraic
connectivity λE1 (see App. 3: S-1 for a detailed description), where a zero value means the decomposition of the E-PIN into two
disconnected components. λE1 drops sharply in the beginning of 2005 and reaches an all-time low in the beginning of 2007 (Fig.
3-c), pointing to a structural fragility of the E-PIN prior to the GFC’08. This is an intriguing fact from the network perspective,
because both PIN are dense with edge densities ρ > 0.3, average in-/out-degrees well above 20 and a minimal edge weight of
eth = 52 million USD during all times (see App. 3: S-3).
We have seen that the build-up of the GFC’08 can be well described under the PIN framework, confirming the conventional un-
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derstanding, yet providing new insights from the network point of view. Two rather simple early-warning indicators for potential
financial crises emerge from this analysis: The algebraic connectivity λE1 of the E-PIN, as a measure for structural robustness,
and the edge density ρLDp of the LD-PIN, as a measure for the level of interdependence within the global financial system.
2.2 Indicator I: The Algebraic Connectivity of the E-PIN
A (hypothetical) decomposition of the E-PIN is expected to lead to a global economic crisis, since it disconnects international
equity markets. The precise value of λE1 depends on the numbers of nodes and edges and the network topology, rendering values
for different times not directly comparable to each other. However, as explained in App. 3: S-1, for most practical applications
with N 2, one is an effective upper bound and, as such, the interval ]0, 1] offers a quasi-absolute scale. An alternative scale is
set by the value of the next-largest eigenvalue of the normalised Laplacian λ2 ≥ λ1, where one can consider the difference of both
values ∆λ = λ2−λ1, given that λ2 is approximately constant and smaller than one. Looking at Fig. 3-c, where λE2 and ∆λE are
given for reference, both scales point to an increased structural fragility of the E-PIN before and during the GFC’08, which we
will investigate more closely now. Two fundamental questions here concern the properties of this instability, namely if it affects
the whole network and to what extend, and which countries are most-related to it.
To address the first issue, we consider the graph bi-section, given by the ordering of nodes according to the signatures of the
entries of the eigenvector ~vE1 associated with λ
E
1 (Fiedler vector), which we call Fiedler bi-section [31, 32]. As stated in App.
3: S-1, this is expected to result in a good graph bi-section, in terms of a low cut ratio R(s+,s−) = scut/(|s+| · |s−|), when λE1 is
close to zero.
To evaluate the quality of Fiedler bi-sections of both PIN, we compare them with different types of random bi-sections, where
the nodes of a PIN are randomly divided into two groups of equal size, random sizes of 1 to N− 1 nodes or sizes of the cor-
responding Fiedler bi-section (labelled Fiedler-like). The results of this exercise are summarised in App. 3: S-3, where we use
the cut depth Dcut of a bi-section of weighted graphs, which relates the average weight of edges between the two partitions of a
bi-section to the average edge weight of the whole network. A value larger than one indicates that two partitions are connected
by stronger-than-average edges, while the opposite is true for a value smaller than one. We see that Fiedler bi-sections, which
are far outside the given 99%-confidence intervals, are significantly different from any random bi-section of the E- as well as the
LD-PIN.
Thus, given the moderately low values of λE1 observed in the years before the GFC’08, the Fiedler vector can be used to detect
the fault lines in the E-PIN. The details of this bi-section are summarised in App. 3: S-7, where the nodes contained in the smaller
sections sλ ,Esmall and their in- and out-degrees (numbers in parentheses), as well as the corresponding fractions of nodes f
λ ,E
small for all
years, are given. Note that such a bi-section is always possible, while one expects an approximately equal partition of a graph for
large values of λ1, since this will, on average, minimise the cut ratio in the absence of a particular λ1-instability. This is exactly
what was observed for the E-PIN at the beginning and the end of the observation period and for the LD-PIN at all times.
We use the parameter triple T (E) = (λE1 , f
λ ,E
small, D
λ ,E
cut ) for the description of the observed structural instability of the E-PIN prior
and during the GFC’08. Considering Fig. 3-d, where the percentage of nodes f λ ,Esmall is given by the red numbers, one sees that
the drop of λE1 at the beginning of 2005 can be explained by the emergence of a sparsely connected group of countries, which is
expressed through the small cut depth Dλ ,Ecut at that time.
This picture is changing dramatically during the GFC’08, when the cut depth rises substantially in the beginning of 2009, while
λE1 recovers partially. This is explained trough a very peculiar network configuration, where the US and UK, which are the most
central nodes in the E-PIN (see Fig. 2-c), enter the much smaller section sλ ,Esmall (see App. 3: S-7), indicating considerable fault
lines within the E-PIN during the crises.
Next, we identify the nodes which can be related strongest to the emergence of the fragility of the E-PIN at the beginning of
2005. Many of the high-degree nodes in sλ ,Esmall during 2005-2008 are classified as OFC, defined as “a country or jurisdiction
that provides financial services to non-residents on a scale that is incommensurate with the size and the financing of its domestic
economy” ([33], page 9), such as the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands or Guernsey. On average, OFC make up around one third of
nodes in the E-PIN, while lists of OFC according to [33] and found in the E-PIN are given in App. 3: S-2. This finding raises the
question if a tight integration of OFC into the E-PIN can be associated with the observed structural instability.
To answer this question, we remove multiple groups of 1-10 nodes and observe the resulting changes in λE1 for 2005-2008. The
new E-PIN is defined as the largest strongly-connected component after that node removal. It is reasonable to assume that a node
or a group of nodes are relevant for the formation of the observed λE1 -instability if removing it leads to a considerable increase in
λE1 to a value larger than 0.5: either a clear jump of λ
E
1 to a value around 0.7, or the same qualitative picture as shown in Fig. 3-c,
is observed. Such instability lifting between 2005-2008 can be partial or complete, i.e. during some years or the whole period.
The only two countries, which completely lift λE1 when being removed, are Bahrain and Kuwait. This suggests that the observed
structural instability is centred around these two Middle Eastern countries, which are both not highly central to the E-PIN in
terms of their total degrees or strengths. One may therefore conclude that the observed λE1 -instability is not of systemic rele-
vance. Note, however, that this is a static picture, where it is not at all clear how a full or partial break-up of a graph, caused by the
removal of some edges or nodes, affects the dynamics in the network, where scenarios such as cascading failures are imaginable.
Furthermore, the modern financial system is a global one and the situation turns out to be more complex when considering groups
of countries, as is expected from the network perspective.
For pairs of countries, Bermuda and Guernsey are the only combination which can partially lift λE1 , bar pairs involving Bahrain
or Kuwait. For triples, we found two groups made of the UK, Jersey, and either Bermuda or Egypt, which partially lift the
instability; again, bar those involving previously found single countries or pairs. For larger groups, the picture turns out to be
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more complex. Note that an exhaustive check of all possible combinations of groups of sizes n = 4-10 is computationally infea-
sible because of the super-exponentially growing number of possible groups. We therefore use a statistical two-step breadth-first
search algorithm to detect combinations of countries that are involved in the formation of the λE1 -instability. After removing
Bahrain and Kuwait from the pool of possible selections, we perform the following computations:
1. Breadth: For n ∈ {4, . . . , 10}, randomly draw 104 samples and separately calculate λE1 between 2005 and 2008. Next,
order all countries according to the frequency that they have been involved in groups lifting λE1 for at least one year.
2. Depth: For n ∈ {4, . . . , 10}, draw again 104 samples and check the λE1 -instability, but now half (round-up) of nodes of
each sample is drawn from the corresponding ten most-frequent countries from step one, and the other half is drawn from
the remaining pool. This procedure is based on the observation that approximately ten most-frequent countries show a
relative frequency in their numbers of occurrences higher than what one expects from a pure random selection. Again,
order all countries according to their frequencies of being found in groups lifting λE1 for at least one year.
Since this search routine is non-deterministic for n= 4-10, we perform five full rounds and average the results over all outcomes.
The final results are summarised in Tab. 1, where the average probability of finding a combination of nodes, whose removal leads
to a jump in λE1 , is given by pλ . Its step-like behaviour for rising values of n is caused by the rounding rule of step two. We should
point out that there are no considerable fluctuations in the overall search results between different rounds, which is especially
true for large n, such as n = 9 and n = 10, with mean-over-standard-deviation ratios of pλ of 0.017 and 0.008, respectively.
The countries mostly associated with the λE1 -instability are shown in the right column. For n > 3, the 15 most-frequently found
countries are ordered according to their frequencies of occurrence. There is a group of OFC (Bermuda, Guernsey and Jersey), the
UK and Egypt, which are found persistently and are considered central to the observed instability. For less-frequently associated
nodes, there are several countries which show up repeatedly, but in different positions. These changes of macroscopic ordering
are attributed to network effects, in the sense that the removal of some nodes can only lead to a rise in λE1 when contained
in certain compounds. It is most difficult, i.e. there are the fewest combinations found to lift λE1 , in the beginning of 2008,
suggesting that the instability is most deeply rooted in the network structure of the E-PIN at the onset of the GFC’08. In addition,
any combination able of lifting λE1 at that time involves the group of nodes Guernsey, Egypt, Luxembourg and the UK, which
is particularly interesting because Luxembourg is not frequently occurring, but highly central to the E-PIN. Note, furthermore,
that the three countries mostly associated with the drop in λE1 in 2005, Bahrain, Bermuda and Kuwait, are found to be related to
a similar phenomenon within the SD-PIN (see App. 3: S-9), which underpins the obtained results and further demonstrates the
applicability of the used concepts.
To quantify the concentration of countries classified as OFC among the nodes associated with the instability of the E-PIN, we
estimate the average representation of OFC among all nodes found by step two of the above search routine. We define the
quotient
QλOFC (n) =
f λOFC (n)
f EOFC
, (1)
where f xOFC , x ∈ {λ , E}, is the averaged relative frequency of OFC between 2005-2008 in the groups associated with the λE1 -
instability and in the E-PIN, respectively. A value of QλOFC greater than one, which is observed consistently, means a statistical
over-representation of OFC among the countries associated with the λE1 -instability before the GFC’08. One observes a decrease
of QλOFC, with rising n which is expected because OFC represent the minority of nodes.
In our opinion, this consistent over-representation of OFC suggests the necessity of a further investigation of the central role
of individual countries and groups of countries, such as OFC, regarding the stability of the global financial system, for which
methodologies from network science, as presented in this work, could prove useful.
Two remarks are due at this point. First, even though we observed a structural destabilisation of the E-PIN, as measured by λE1 ,
as early as 2005, a note of caution should be made, when directly relating this finding to the GFC’08. It is not clear, if and how
this instability played a role during the crisis, where the main question concerns the reconciliation of the static structural picture
with a dynamic event. A low value of λE1 might, however, be associated with a potentially increased susceptibility of the financial
system towards shocks.
Second, the algebraic connectivity of the LD-PIN, λLD1 , might as well serve as an indicator for potential financial crises because a
separation of large parts of international debt markets is equally expected to lead to drastic consequences for the global financial
system. In the current analysis, the temporal evolution of λLD1 does not give reasons for major concerns. However, from the
beginning of data taking, its value is constantly decreasing, still remaining at a relatively high level, till it suddenly rises in
the beginning of 2006. A possible explanation for this behaviour, which will not be discussed further, is the rise of the Target
Nominal Federal Funds Rate of the US Federal Reserve System [34]. This coincides with a temporary slow-down in the increase
of the number of edges in the LD-PIN (see Fig. 1-b) and a halt in its expansion (see Fig. 3-a).
2.3 Indicator II: The Edge Density of the LD-PIN
Our second network indicator for potential financial crises is the edge density of the LD-PIN at the minimal percolation edge
threshold ρLDp = 52million USD. As shown in Fig. 1-b, its temporal evolution can be used to describe the magnitudes of NOS-
CDS and GMV-ELD [24]. It can be seen that the evolution of all three quantities share some prominent features, while the curves
for NOA-CDS and GMV-ELD lag somehow behind. The fact that the scale of the rise and fall of the values of derivatives is
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much larger than that of ρLDp can be explained by several factors. First, financial derivatives can be re-bundled to higher-order
products, inflating the total value with respect to the underlying base assets, resulting in a global derivative market (notional
amounts) which is at least one order in magnitude larger than the total volume in PIN [24] or world-GDP [29]. Furthermore, it
is known that small changes in (edge) density can cause abrupt changes in global properties of a wide range of systems (phase
transition), including many complex networks [28, 35, 36].
Consequently, there must be non-linear effects present. We introduce a simple phenomenological non-linear short-term memory
model (NLSMM), which is based on the assumption that total market values of financial derivatives scale non-linearly with the
percolation edge density of the LD-PIN, ρLDp , while certain memory (hysteresis) effects can be observed.
For the total market value VD (tn) (NOA or GMV) of some derivative VD at time tn, with respect to a reference value Vr =VD (tr),
we write
VD (tn) = Vr ·ar [ ρ¯γ1 (tn) + ρ¯γ2 (tn−1) ] , where ρ¯ (tn) ≡ ρLDp (tn)/ρLDp (tr) . (2)
Here, tn−1 denotes the data point before tn, which is the previous year for a 1-year period of the CPIS data [18]; γ1 and γ2 are
scaling exponents, where a value different from one implies non-linearity; ar is a scaling factor, accounting for the arbitrarily
chosen reference value Vr.
We consider different lead/lag time shifts of ∆t = +12,+6,0,−6,−12 months, according to the 6-months period of derivative
data [24], between ρLDp and NOA-CDS/GMV-ELD, when performing the fits to determine the scaling exponents γ1,2 (see section
Methodology for details on the fitting procedure.). Positive values of ∆t (lead) indicate that changes in ρLDp cause changes in
NOA-CDS/GMV-ELD, while negative values (lag) indicate that changes in ρLDp are caused by changes in NOA-CDS/GMV-
ELD. We find (∆t)CDS = 6months and (∆t)ELD = 0months. As expected, there is a tendency towards a lead of ρLDp with respect
to NOA-CDS/GMV-ELD, while a higher resolution in both data sets [18, 24] is expected to considerably clarify these relations.
Note furthermore that positive values of ∆t enhance the applicability of the NLSMM (2) for the indication of financial crises,
since potentially high levels of market interdependence can be spotted earlier.
The results for both fits, using (2), are shown in Figs. 4-a and -b with reference values of 2005 and 2002, respectively. One can
see that the NLSMM achieves a good description of the proliferation of CDS and ELD in most cases and that the agreement is
especially good for the years around the GFC’08 between 2007-2009. The mismatch for the year-2005 NOA-CDS point may
either be considered as an outlier, or be explained through the coinciding start of the CDS statistics data taking [24], which fell
into a time of large market growth.
For both fits, the scaling exponents γ1,2 are much larger than one, showing that the relations between ρLDp and the market values of
financial derivative products are highly non-linear. Note that changes in the reference point Vr mainly change the coefficient ar,
while the scaling exponents γ1,2 stay approximately constant. We define the ratio m≡ γ2/γ1, which indicates the time span over
which changes in the LD-PIN and derivatives markets are coupled, where a value greater than one means that past-year values of
ρLDp contribute stronger in (2) than present-year values. It might serve as a measure for “market memory”. Here, mELD mCDS,
indicating that changes in ρLDp have a longer lasting effect on GMV-ELD than on NOA-CDS, which means, on the other hand,
that NOA-CDS reacts faster to changes in the LD-PIN.
A way to make use of the NLSMM for the quantitative indication of systemic risk and, as such, potential financial crises, is to set
a warning threshold wth in terms of a maximal level for the market value of a certain product, which one deems still safe. One
such possibility is a dynamic threshold, i.e. a threshold which allows for market changes which a certain derivative product may
be coupled to, such as a macroeconomic reference variable (RV). If VRV (t) denotes the value of an RV at time t, we require
VD (t) ≤ wth (t) = FD,RVmax · VRV (t) , (3)
where VD is the market value of some derivative product (NOA or GMV), and F
D,RV
max is a multiplier, which sets the maximal
proportion between VD and VRV . This is a dynamic threshold, in the sense that, if VRV increases, VD is also allowed to increase.
However, if VRV decreases, such that VD comes close to wth or if VD exceeds the threshold, VD must be reduced by some mecha-
nism. A regulatory approach, based on monetary incentives to enforce a certain “equilibrium level” FD,RVmax , could be to imposed
an RV-progressive transaction or holding tax on financial derivatives, which makes especially speculative trading unattractive, as
soon as the level of derivative D comes close to FD,RVmax .
In Fig. 3-e, we investigate eight macroeconomic quantities with respect to their usability as RV for GMV-ELD, where the relative
magnitude of Cre f ≡ VELD/VRV is plotted with reference to their year-2002 values (foreign exchange market turnover volumes
for North America, FX vol. (N.A.), are only available from October 2004 on).
We indicate the shape which a suitable reference curves Cre f should approximately follow (shaded area in Fig. 3-e), to deliver a
clear warning signal before the GFC’08, i.e. to be able to set wth appropriately. We identify four potential RV, namely world-GDP
[29], global trade volume of goods (world trade vol., [37]), global stock of foreign direct investment (world-FDI stock, [38]) and
the foreign exchange market turnover volume in Singapore (FX vol. (SG), [39]), while we suggest to exclude the latter because it
only covers a regional market. In our opinion, world-GDP offers the best RV for the case at hand. In addition, GDP is among the
most-frequently referred-to indicators to quantify economic activity and, as such, represents a well-established baseline which
the OTC-derivatives market may be compared to.
The value of FD,RVmax does not need to be set precisely, in the sense that equivalent warning signals will be generated within a com-
fortably large range of values. Taking world-GDP as RV, FD,GDPmax can be set within the ranges of 0.53−0.85 and 0.012−0.018
for warning signals in the beginning of 2007 for NOA-CDS and GMV-ELD, respectively, while the actual values have been set to
0.56 and 0.014 in Figs. 4-a and -b. This might provide enough time to prevent the worst consequences of the insetting downturn.
To further investigate the relation between the LD-PIN and the OTC-derivatives market and the applicability of the proposed
6
methodology, we tested the NLSMM (2) for the description of all major classes of financial derivatives and their first subcate-
gories, given in [24]. The results are summarised in Tab. 2. One can see that the NLSMM gives mostly good descriptions for
CDS and ELD, while those for foreign exchange (FXD) and interest rate derivatives (IRD) are generally poor. Interestingly,
NOA of unallocated derivatives (UAD, see Fig. 4-c), which stems from the difference of reporting institutions between [24] and
[40, 41], is described very well, offering a tool to indirectly measure this large, but “hidden” variable.
An additional class of derivatives where the NLSMM offers decent descriptive power and which saw a strong rise in popularity
in the years before the GFC’08, for both hedging and speculation, are commodity-linked derivatives (CLD). Here, the strategy
to hedge equity and bond risks using CLD, creating large amounts of additional interdependencies in global financial markets,
failed in face of the crisis [42].
One might ask if the edge density of the E-PIN ρE contributes additional information to the analysis similar to that provided by
ρLDp . Note, at this point, that there is an underlying reason for choosing ρLDp to describe the proliferation of financial derivative
products; namely, LD-securities can be seen as “durable” base assets for or be linked to various derivatives, which is generally not
the case for E-securities. We may, however, infer some information from the evolution of ρE . We observe two major decreases of
ρE between the years from 2003 to 2004 and 2005 to 2006 (see Fig. 1-a), where the number of edges is approximately increasing
in the same manner as the number of nodes, consequently leading to a reduction of the edge density (see App. 3: S-1). These
two events might be associated with the pick-up of equity investment after the 2001 recession [23] and the slow down of growth
of the LD-PIN (see previous subsection), offering an incentive for investors to switch from debt to equity securities.
In summary, both early-warning indicators for financial crises are intrinsically tied to the network perspective, where the global
financial system is treated as a complex multi-layered network consisting of strongly-interacting components. Especially, in view
of the recent financial crisis, which conventional models have not been able to foresee, or even to describe properly, this offers
a completely new perspective to macroeconomics, where the topology of a complex system, such as the international financial
architecture, is taken into account explicitly. In our opinion, the GFC’08 is an excellent learning ground for the development of
new methodologies aiming at the prevention of future large-scale economic downturns. We finally stress that, one of the biggest
obstacles for the development of such tools is the scarcity of openly-available high-quality data, which is especially daunting in
the dawning age of big data.
3 Discussion
We have investigated the applicability of the presented early-warning indicators for financial crises by looking at the robustness
of the results against changes in the edge threshold eth, which has previously been set according to the percolation properties of
the LD-PIN (see Section Methodology). It turns out that results from the E-PIN are highly insensitive to the choice of eth, while
results stemming from the LD-PIN are robust against variations of eth in a conveniently large window of up to 30million USD.
To probe the threshold dependence of the results, we rise eth in a step-wise fashion from 1million to 1billion USD, considering
a total of 500 values, which are equally-spaced on a logarithmic scale. The results from this exercise are shown in App. 3: S-6.
The threshold dependences of the network sizes, in terms of the numbers of nodes of the E- and LD-PIN, are shown in panels (a)
and (b), respectively, where a near constant value of epth = 52million USD is identified above which the LD-PIN (b) disintegrates
rapidly.
The eth-dependence of the edge density ρLD of the LD-PIN, which we have taken as a network-proxy to measure the interdepen-
dence of financial markets, is shown in panel (d) of Fig. S-4 in App. 3: S-7. The detailed evolution of ρLD over time is rather
sensitive to the choice of eth, while most fitting results for the description of financial derivatives, when using (2), do not change
within a range of eth = 25−55million USD (shaded regions in panels (b) and (d) of Fig. S-4), where the number of nodes of the
LD-PIN is approximately constant. This window of possible values is considered comfortably large for practical implementa-
tions of the proposed methodologies. There are, however, slight differences of the goodness-of-fit for different derivatives. The
proliferation of CDS is generally described better at larger threshold within the stated region, while one achieves better descrip-
tion of ELD and CLD for lower values of eth.
The threshold dependence of the algebraic connectivity λE1 of the E-PIN, as a measure for robustness of the global financial
system, and as such for the world economy, is shown in panel (c) of Fig. S-4. The main features of the temporal evolution of λE1 ,
such as its sharp drop in 2005 and its persistent low value until the GFC’08, are largely threshold-independent. No qualitative
changes are observed for values of eth between 1 to 100million USD, which makes the algebraic connectivity of the E-PIN a
robust indicator for practical implementation in the current case. We remark that the actual details of such a λE1 -instability should
be carefully investigated, when detected, as we have done in this work. Its large value for high thresholds eth stems from the
induced removal of nodes, resulting in a more robust core-component.
Considering the anti-correlation of volume fractions of the total PIN shown in Fig. 2-b, one may also take an alternative approach:
a joint threshold of, say, eth = 110million USD, for both PIN together, where particular values used for the E- and LD-PIN are
determined on a yearly basis according to their respective fractions of the total PIN. This has been done. It turns out that results
do not change considerably, which is the reason for choosing a simpler single value for both networks at all times.
4 Methodology
Network set-up: Data for different types of cross-border portfolio investment networks (PIN) for eleven consecutive years,
2002-2012 (beginning of the year), come from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) [18], conducted by the In-
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ternational Monetary Fund (IMF). Portfolio investment is an indirect investment, defined here as a cross-border transactions or
positions of equity or debt securities, excluding direct investment, reserve assets, financial derivatives and bank loans [43]. The
CPIS includes aggregated data for end-of-the-year positions in USD from 78 reporting creditor countries for three types of secu-
rities: equity (E), long- (LD) and short-term (SD) debts. E-securities, such as shares, stocks, participations or similar documents
indicating ownership, and LD-securities, such as bonds, debentures and notes with a maturity of more than one year, make up
for the majority in terms of total volume, approximately 94%, as seen in Fig. 3-a and App. 3: S-3. We therefore concentrate on
these two types. A summary of results on the SD-PIN and how the proposed methodologies can be used for its analysis is given
in App. 3: S-9.
In the networks constructed from the CPIS data, nodes are represented by individual countries and weighted directed edges by
aggregated portfolio investment positions between them. In terms of the weight matrix W (see App. 3: S-1), an investment
position from country i in country j is given by wi j.
To allow for a better comparability of results over time, all monetary values (investment positions, derivatives statistics, trade
flows and market turnover volumes) have been adjusted for changes in world-GDP, using the GDP deflator [29] (constant 2013-
values).
The LD-PIN is seen to have an approximately constant percolation edge threshold with an minimum value of epth = 52million
USD (see Fig. S-4-b in App. 3: S-8). This is the edge weight above which the LD-PIN rapidly disintegrates, when consecutively
removing edges of larger weights, as measured by the size of its largest strongly-connected component. There are two notable
exceptions to this behaviour. Namely, before and during the GFC’08, in 2007 and 2008, the percolation point rises by about a
factor of three, which is an interesting observation in its own right. The graph connectivity at the edge threshold epth, where edges
wi j < e
p
th are deleted, i.e. wi j ≡ 0, is expected to contribute dominantly to the global properties of the weighted network, while
still allowing for a good comparability of results over time.
Data between non-reporting countries, as well as liabilities between any two countries, are missing from the CPIS [18], which
gives the resulting networks a “sea urchin-like” topology. Nevertheless, the present data include mutual investment positions for
all major economies, bar the Mainland of China, where cross-border capital flows are highly restricted and, as such, would not
contribute significantly [44, 45].
To account for both the percolation properties of the LD-PIN and the incompleteness of data, we define a PIN as the largest
strongly-connected component, after applying the minimum percolation edge threshold epth = 52million USD.
There is no such general percolation point for the E-PIN. However, for some years, a rather low value below 10million USD
can be found, while for other instances, a more continuous disintegration with a rising edge threshold is observed, as shown in
Fig. S-4-a. This is most notable for the year 2007, where the largest number of nodes for low values of eth is observed, which
already indicates a relatively fragile expansion of the E-PIN prior to the GFC’08. We note that it may come to negative positions
in the CPIS data under certain conditions, as explained in the CPIS guide [18]. Such positions are indeed observed, making a
total number of nodes larger than the 78 reporting countries possible.
For reasons of comparability and simplicity, the same edge threshold is used for the E-PIN in this investigation, where the net-
work volume is of similar magnitude. Final PIN volumes, after extracting the largest strongly connected components, are around
95% of the initial amounts, i.e. we make use of the great majority of data after the above-described clean-ups.
Model fit: We use a least-square method to fit the percolation edge density of the LD-PIN ρLDp to the data from the OTC-
derivatives statistics [24], when implementing the non-linear short-term memory model (NLSMM, Eq. 2). The best-fit lead/lag
time shifts between both quantities, where we considered values of ∆t ∈ {+12,+6,0,−6,−12}months, are obtained by min-
imising the normalised squared-difference ||VD− f it(VD,∆t)||2/||VD||2, where || · || is the Euclidean norm of a vector containing
values from different time instances, VD is the market value of financial derivative D, in either notional outstanding amounts
(NOA) or gross-market values (GMV), and f it(VD,∆t) is the best-fit of (2) for a given ∆t. Overall differences in the average
values of derivatives for different time windows are accounted for in this way.
The Pearson product correlation coefficient pr [46] has been used as a goodness-of-fit criterion, where we accept the best-
fit f it(VD,∆t) if pr(VD, f it(VD,∆t)) ≥ 0.9, which turns out to provide overally-good results. We conditionally accept a fit if
0.85≤ pr(VD, f it(VD,∆t))< 0.9, while we reject a fit if pr(VD, f it(VD,∆t))< 0.85.
Note that PIN and derivatives data have different time resolutions of 12 and 6 months, respectively. To be able to make full use
of all available data, we interpolate ρLDp to obtain the same resolution for both data sets. This is justified on the ground that ρLDp
is a slowly-changing variable compared to all derivatives data. Alternatively, dropping one half of the derivatives data is seen to
lead to less accurate results, in the sense that more fits are actually accepted due to the induced smoothing-effects.
As can be seen from Tab. 2, one obtains one negative scaling exponent (mostly γ1) for the best-fit solution in some cases. De-
pending on the absolute value, as compared to the other exponent, this means that the corresponding contribution is suppressed,
and the fit is effectively achieved through one parameter only. Note, however, that fit results are not satisfactory in all of these
cases.
Data for credit default swaps (CDS) are only available starting from the end of 2004 onward. To be able to make use of all data
points for all times, we consider intervals of varying lengths for different values of ∆t, which introduces a bias towards lags of
ρLDp , when selecting the best-fit. Obtaining persistent lead relations for all given CDS statistics, strengthens the results, which
does not change when considering intervals of equal lengths.
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Appendix 1: Figures
Figure 1: Temporal Evolution of network key properties: number of nodes N, number of edges M and the resulting edge density ρ , of the two
considered PIN relative to their corresponding year-2002 values (dotted reference line). a: E-PIN. The daily time series of the S&P Global1200
stock index is given for reference. b: LD-PIN. The temporal evolution of the gross-market value of equity-linked derivatives (GMV-ELD) and
the total notional outstanding amount of credit default swaps (NOA-CDS, data not available prior to 2005) mirror the qualitative evolution of
the percolation edge density ρLDp .
Figure 2: Cumulative node strength (a, b) and eigenvector centrality (c, d) distributions of the E- (a, c) and the LD-PIN (b, d), respectively.
Numerical values cover about the same ranges for both networks. In particular, node strengths span about five orders of magnitude with the
largest values before the GFC’08. Strength distributions may be classified as “super-heavy-tailed”, since there is a O (1)-probability for most
values which indicates a strong hierarchical network structure. The US is by far the most central node in the E-PIN, with the highest strength
and a dominating eigenvector centrality.
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Figure 3: Left: Temporal evolution of general PIN characteristics. a: Volumes (edge weight sums) in USD of the total PIN, the E- and
the LD-PIN. For better comparability, all monetary values have been adjusted for changes in world-GDP (constant year-2013 values). The
GFC’08 causes a contraction of both networks, which is especially pronounced in the E-PIN. b: Fractions of total PIN volume from panel (a)
contained in the E- and LD-PIN. One observes a constant shift in composition from the LD-PIN towards the E-PIN in the years before crisis.
c: Algebraic connectivity λ1 as a measure for network robustness against node/edge failure (removal). λE1 reaches an all-time low just before
the GFC’08. λE2 ≥ λE1 and ∆λE = λE2 −λE1 are given as an alternative reference scale to evaluate the stability of the E-PIN. d: Cut depths
of Fieder bi-sections of the E- and the LD-PIN. Numbers represent the fractions f λsmall in percent of nodes contained in the corresponding
smaller sections. While the LD-PIN is cut evenly without large variations in cut depth, the corresponding quantities of the E-PIN point to major
topological changes before and during the crisis. Right (e): Comparison of potential macroeconomic reference variables (RV) for setting a
dynamic warning threshold wth(t) for the gross-market value (GMV) of OTC-traded equity-linked derivatives (ELD): E- and LD-PIN volumes,
world-GDP [29], world trade volume (goods) [37], global stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) [38], global stock exchange trading volume
[29], foreign exchange market turnover volumes in Singapore and North America (US, Canada and Mexico, only available from October 2004
on). For a RV X , the temporal evolution of the quantity GMV-ELD/X is given relative to its year-2002 value, where nearest points in time
have been matched. The shaded area indicates the shape a suitable RV should follow to generate a clear warning signal prior to the GFC’08.
World-GDP (blue line) is seen to offer the best RV from the given sample.
Figure 4: Fit of the non-linear short-term memory model (NLSMM, Eq. 2) for the phenomenological description of the proliferation of OTC-
traded financial derivative products, where values are given in relative magnitudes with respect to a reference year. One mostly observes a
good agreement between data and the NLSMM. Setting a warning threshold wth, which has been set as a multiple F
D,GDP
max of world-GDP (gray
dashed line), potentially dangerous levels of interdependency (red dots) can be detected, where the red dashed line indicates the time of first
warning. For positive time shifts ∆t, such a warning signal is generated before the actual fitted values reach wth, as is the case for NOA-CDS (a)
and NOA-UAD (c). For all shown derivatives, the NLSMM in combination with the specified warning thresholds wth, produces warning signals
at the beginning of 2007. It is particularly interesting that the NLSMM describes the “hidden” variable NOA-UAD well [24, 40, 41]. a: NOA-
CDS, with γ1 = 11.0, γ2 = 6.6, ∆t = 6months, pr = 0.92, wth = 0.56world-GDP. b: GMV-ELD, with γ1 = 7.3, γ2 = 8.0, ∆t = 0, pr = 0.95,
wth = 0.014world-GDP. c: NOA-UAD, with unallocated derivatives, γ1 = 5.9, γ2 = 6.0, ∆t = 6months, pr = 0.95, wth = 0.75world-GDP.
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Appendix 2: Tables
n pλ QλOFC countries most-frequently associated with the λE1 -instability
1 - - Bahrain, Kuwait
2 - - Bermuda, Guernsey
3 - - Bermuda, Guernsey, Jersey, Egypt
4 0.03 2.05 Bermuda, Guernsey, United Kingdom, Jersey, Egypt, Ukraine, Aruba, Luxembourg, Turkey,
Latvia, Isle of Man, United States, Spain, Malaysia, Curac¸ao
5 0.09 1.78 Bermuda, Guernsey, United Kingdom, Jersey, Egypt, Russia, Uruguay, Switzerland, Turkey,
Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Romania, Isle of Man, Hong Kong, Curac¸ao
6 0.11 1.61 Bermuda, Guernsey, United Kingdom, Jersey, Malta, Russia, Egypt, Mexico, Kazakhstan,
Venezuela, Philippines, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Italy, Israel
7 0.23 1.52 Bermuda, Guernsey, United Kingdom, Jersey, Egypt, Denmark, Isle of Man, Luxembourg,
India, Mexico, Netherlands, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Cyprus, Venezuela
8 0.24 1.39 Bermuda, Guernsey, United Kingdom, Jersey, Egypt, Latvia, Canada, Austria, Bulgaria,
Spain, Malta, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Gibraltar
9 0.40 1.33 Bermuda, Guernsey, United Kingdom, Jersey, Egypt, India, Gibraltar, Latvia, Spain,
Germany, Luxembourg, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Italy, Japan
10 0.41 1.36 Bermuda, Guernsey, United Kingdom, Jersey, Egypt, India, Latvia, Hungary, Singapore,
Canada, Barbados, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Bahamas
Table 1: List of countries most-associated with the λE1 -instability for groups of sizes n = 1-10. A country or group of countries is associated
with the λE1 -instability if its removal from the E-PIN leads to a partial or complete lifting of λ
E
1 over a value of 0.5 during the period 2005-2008.
The cases n = 1,2,3 have been treated exhaustively. Bahrain and Kuwait are seen to be the only single countries whose removal lifts λE1 , while
the picture turns out to be more complex when considering larger groups. For n = 4-10, a two-step breadth-first search algorithm has been
used, excluding Bahrain and Kuwait. Results have been averaged over five full rounds. The average probability of finding a combination of
nodes, whose removal leads to a jump in λE1 , is given by pλ . Its step-like behaviour for rising values of n is caused by the rounding rule used
in step two of the search routine. The 15 most-frequently found countries are shown. The group consisting of Bermuda, Guernsey, United
Kingdom, Jersey and Egypt is persistently associated with the λE1 -instability, suggesting that these countries are most central for its formation.
QλOFC estimates the average representation of off-shore financial centres (OFC) among all nodes found by the search routine. A value larger
than one, which is observed persistently, means a relative over-representation of OFC.
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name f worldGDP ar γ1 γ2 m ∆ t pr decision
NOA
total 10.939 0.7 4.1 3.3 0.8 12 0.7 no
CDS
total 0.934 0.9 11.0 6.6 0.6 6 0.92 yes
SNI 0.543 0.7 9.6 6.9 0.7 6 0.93 yes
MNI 0.39 1.6 12.8 6.0 0.5 6 0.9 yes
FXD
total 1.024 0.6 3.4 2.6 0.8 6 0.64 no
F&S 0.52 0.6 -1.3 5.7 - -6 0.8 no
SWP 0.265 0.8 0.1 2.6 17.8 12 0.31 no
OPT 0.239 0.6 5.7 2.1 0.4 6 0.89 maybe
IRD
total 7.454 0.8 2.7 3.8 1.4 12 0.62 no
FWD 0.64 1.1 -4.1 6.3 - 12 0.53 no
SWP 5.803 0.8 2.8 3.7 1.3 12 0.62 no
OPT 1.011 0.7 5.6 3.2 0.6 6 0.85 maybe
ELD
total 0.166 0.7 4.6 7.0 1.5 -6 0.92 yes
F&S 0.043 0.8 8.0 2.4 0.3 6 0.84 no
OPT 0.122 0.6 4.7 6.2 1.3 -6 0.9 yes
CLD
total 0.215 0.7 9.8 14.1 1.4 -6 0.87 maybe
GLD 0.011 0.4 5.5 -0.7 - 0 0.77 no
OTH 0.205 1.0 10.6 15.0 1.4 -6 0.87 maybe
F&S 0.123 0.6 15.4 8.0 0.5 6 0.89 maybe
OPT 0.082 0.9 15.0 13.4 0.9 -6 0.85 maybe
UAD 1.146 0.5 5.9 6.0 1.0 6 0.95 yes
GMV
total 0.331 0.6 3.3 7.2 2.2 12 0.77 no
CDS
total 0.052 0.9 17.8 16.4 0.9 12 0.94 yes
SNI 0.031 0.6 17.5 17.2 1.0 12 0.94 yes
MNI 0.021 2.1 18.2 14.9 0.8 12 0.93 yes
FXD
total 0.037 0.4 4.3 5.7 1.3 12 0.72 no
F&S 0.013 0.5 -9.9 6.4 - 0 0.66 no
SWP 0.017 0.5 2.3 5.2 2.2 12 0.67 no
OPT 0.006 0.5 7.0 7.4 1.1 12 0.88 maybe
IRD
total 0.151 0.8 -4.4 7.1 - 12 0.62 no
FWD 0.001 0.7 5.5 10.6 1.9 12 0.66 no
SWP 0.131 0.8 -5.1 7.2 - 12 0.62 no
OPT 0.018 0.8 0.3 6.2 19.3 12 0.62 no
ELD
total 0.019 0.6 7.3 8.0 1.1 0 0.95 yes
F&S 0.005 0.5 8.2 7.8 0.9 6 0.93 yes
OPT 0.014 0.6 8.0 7.5 0.9 0 0.95 yes
CLD
total 0.036 0.9 10.0 15.8 1.6 0 0.86 maybe
GLD 0.001 0.5 5.2 4.4 0.8 -6 0.68 no
OTH 0.035 1.2 10.6 16.7 1.6 0 0.87 maybe
UAD 0.037 0.5 -2.6 7.2 - 6 0.81 no
GCE 0.063 0.4 4.5 4.1 0.9 12 0.85 maybe
NOA-EXD FUT 0.423 0.6 3.5 5.6 1.6 -12 0.9 yes
NOA-EXD OPT 0.809 0.8 5.5 4.2 0.8 -6 0.8 no
Table 2: Fit results between the percolation edge density ρLDp of the LD-PIN and notional outstanding amounts (NOA) and gross-market
values (GMV) of all major classes of OTC-traded financial derivatives and their first subcategories [24], using the NLSMM (2) (scaling factor
ar and exponents γ1,2 for a fit of VD(t)/Vr). The fraction/multiple of world-GDP f worldGDP of NOA/GMV as of the middle of 2008 is given
for reference for each class/subcategory, where the mean between the 2008- and 2009-values has been taken for world-GDP. The quantity
m≡ γ2/γ1 indicates the time span over which changes in the LD-PIN and the derivative market are coupled (“market memory”), where a value
greater than one means that past-year values of ρLDp contribute stronger in (2) than present-year values. ∆t (in months) is the best-fit lead/lag
time shift between ρLDp and NOA/GMV of a certain derivative class, where positive values indicate a lead of ρLDp . We use the Pearson product
correlation coefficient pr between the best-fit and market values of derivative products as a goodness-of-fit criterion, where we accept a fit if
pr ≥ 0.9. We say that a certain product may be described by the NLSMM if 0.9 > pr ≥ 0.85 (conditional acceptance), and reject the fit if
pr < 0.85. The major classes are credit default swaps (CDS), foreign exchange derivatives (FXD), interest rate derivatives (IRD), equity-linked
derivatives (ELD) and commodity-linked derivatives (CLD). The first sub-categories are single- and multi- name instruments SNI and MNI for
CDS, respectively, and forwards and swaps (F&S), swaps (SWP), options (OPT) and forwards (FWD) for the other classes. CLD additionally
include gold derivatives (GLD) and others commodities (OTH). Unallocated derivatives (UAD) are values which are not covered in [24], but
are included in [40, 41]. Gross-credit exposure (GCE) measures the positive net-value of contracts, after mutual obligations have been set off
(netting). Fit results for NOA of exchange-traded derivatives (EXD) are given for reference, where one sees that future contracts (FUT) can
also be described by the NLSMM. The NLSMM 2 is seen to be especially suitable for the description of the proliferation of CDS (NOA and
GMV), which is the financial derivative product which has most-frequently been related to the GFC’08.
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Appendix 3: Supplementary Information
S-1: Relevant Concepts and Notations from Graph Theory
Graph theory provides a general mathematical framework to represent and quantify complex networks and their properties [49,
50, 51]. We will use the words network and graph synonymously. A weighted and directed network can be represented by a
graph G = (V , E ), where V = {v1, . . . , vN} is the set of N ≥ 2 nodes in the graph, and E (wi j > 0| i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}) is the set
of weighted edges from node vi to node v j, with M = ord(E ) denoting the number of edges irrespective of their weights. The
whole graph can be represented by a real weight matrix, W = [wi j] ∈ RN×N (wi j 6= w ji, in general). We do not allow self-loops,
i.e. wii = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. We define the volume V of a weighted network as the sum of all its edge weights, which is
V G = ∑i∑ j wi j, {i, j} ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
The in- and out-degrees of a node i are the numbers of in-coming and out-going connections, respectively. In the weight matrix
W , these are given by the respective number of non-zero entries in the ith column or row. The out- and in-strengths of that node
are defined as the ith row- and column-sums of W , respectively. The total strength/degree of a node is then the sum of its in- and
out-degrees/strengths.
The edge density of a graph is defined as the number of actual edges M divided by the number of maximally possible edges Mmax.
For directed networks,
ρ =
M
Mmax
=
M
N2−N .
It is a network size-independent measure for the average connectivity between nodes, but does not take the network structure into
account.
One says that node i connects to node j if there exists a directed path from i to j. A graph is said to be strongly-connected, if
such a directed path exists between any pair of nodes (i, j). The weight matrix W is irreducible in this case. If such a path does
not exit for all node pairs, but the underlying undirected graph is connected, the network is said to be weakly-connected.
The importance of a node to a network is often evaluated in terms of the so-called centrality measures, which quantify the extent
to which a node participates in the path structure of a network, taken from a certain point of view [52, 53, 54]. Simple examples
are node degree and strength which measure short-range connectivity, but often scale with other centrality measures [55, 56, 57].
A measure which captures a node’s higher-order and recursive connections within the whole network is eigenvalue centrality. It
is a type of feedback centrality, defined as the node-component of the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the
weight matrix W .
The algebraic connectivity λ1 of a graph is here defined as the real-part of the smallest non-zero eigenvalue of the normalised
Laplacian LN = 1− D−1in ·W T [58], where D−1in = diag(1/sin1 , . . . , 1/sinN ) is the diagonal matrix consisting of all nodes’ in-
strengths. The Laplacian matrix has exactly one zero eigenvalue for every strongly-connected component. For the case of a
single strongly-connected component, λ1 is the second smallest eigenvalue of LN . It is a measure for the robustness of a network
against edge/node removal [49, 59, 60] because a zero-value means the decomposition of the network into two disconnected
components. It can be used to derive a lower bound on the minimum cut ratio Rcut(S) = wcut(s1,s2)/(|s1| · |s2|) for the bi-section
S(s1,s2) of a graph into two disconnected partitions of nodes s1 and s2 with |s1| and |s2| nodes, respectively, where wcut is the
weight sum of removed edges to perform the cut [49, 61, 62]. Finding the optimal bi-section S(s1,s2) which minimises Rcut
is an NP-hard problem. However, the Fiedler vector ~v1, which is the eigenvector of LN corresponding to λ1, can be used to
approximate this optimal bi-section, if λ1 is small [31, 32]. The sections s+ and s− are then given by the nodes corresponding to
the positive and negative entries of~v1, respectively (Fiedler bi-section), where f λsmall ≡ min{|s+|, |s−|}/N denotes the fraction of
nodes contained in the smaller section. Note that a Fiedler bi-section, like any bi-section where the section sizes are not fixed, is
not expected to be balanced (|s+| ≈ |s−| or f λsmall ≈ 0.5).
A low value of λ1, sufficiently close to zero, is assumed to indicate a structural instability. If the corresponding Fiedler bi-section
is balanced, this instability/fragility of the network is of global nature, i.e. affecting the majority of nodes. On the contrary, an
unbalanced bi-section points to a partial instability, such as a sparsely connected group of nodes.
There is no absolute level for λ1 to evaluate the structural stability of a given network. For practical applications, e.g. for the
analysis of PIN, where we have a single strongly-connected component and N 2, the inequality [58],
0 < λ1 ≤ NN−1 ≈ 1
offers a quasi-absolute scale to judge the potential fragility of a network or compare results for different instances over time with
varying numbers of nodes and edges. A second possibility to assess the value of λ1, which might prove even more useful for
practical applications, is to compare it to λ2, with λ1 ≤ λ2, which is the second smallest non-zero eigenvalue of LN , taken by
its real-part. If λ2 is now roughly constant for different configurations of a network and considerably smaller than one, it can
be used as an additional scale for the assessment of the values of λ1 and their changes over time, where one can consider the
quantity ∆λ ≡ λ2−λ1.
In the context of weighted networks, we can define the cut depth of a graph bi-section S, as Dcut(S)≡ f Sw/ f SM , where f Sw and f SM are
the fractions of the network volume and of the number of edges connecting s1 and s1, respectively, i.e. the fractions of volume and
number of edges which have to be removed to perform the cut. It is a parameter independent of both the network size and edge
weight, which evaluates the average weight of the cut edges, when bi-sectioning a graph. Let 〈w(S)〉 and 〈w(G)〉 denote the aver-
age edge weight contained in wcut and in G, respectively. Then, the cut depth Dcut(S) relates them, as 〈w(S)〉= Dcut(S) · 〈w(G)〉.
Consequently, when Dcut(S) > 1, stronger-than-average edges need to be cut to perform the bi-section S, while the opposite is
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true if Dcut(S)< 1. In App. 3: S-6, we show how the cut depths can be used to describe Fiedler graph bi-sections.
We introduce the parameter triple T (G) = (λ1, f λsmall, D
λ
cut) for the classification of Fiedler bi-sections of weighted single-
component networks G. For Large values of f λsmall > 0.2− 0.3, one may say that an associated λ1-instability is global, i.e.
affecting the majority of nodes in a network, while small values point to a local instability, where the break-up of a network, e.g.
through node failure, is expected to only affect a minority of nodes. Values of Dλ ,Ecut > 1, which indicate the disruption of large
links in the event of a break-up, might have profound impacts on the dynamics within a network.
S-2: Country Lists
Lists of 78 reporting countries of the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS, [18]) from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) as of end-2011, the IMF-46 off-shore financial centres (OFC) given in [33] and the 24 OFC that can be found in the
equity securities portfolio investment network (E-PIN) at least once.
group name included countries
CPIS Reporters
Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Bermuda,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cayman Islands, Chile, Hong Kong, Macao, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Curac¸ao, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Guernsey, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Isle of
Man, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Kosovo, Kuwait, Latvia,
Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands,
Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Vanuatu, Venezuela
OFC (IMF-46)
Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize,
Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominica, Gibraltar,
Grenada, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Lebanon, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Macao, Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Montserrat,
Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Palau, Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, Singapore, St. Kitts
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Switzerland, Turks and Caicos
Islands, Vanuatu, Virgin Islands (UK)
OFC (E-PIN)
Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus,
Gibraltar, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Lebanon, Luxembourg,
Macao, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland
Table S-2: Country lists.
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S-3: PIN Statistics
PIN statistics corresponding to Figs. 1 and 3-(a-d), and Figs. S-5-(a-f) of this SI are given. From top to bottom: Network volumes
V of the the total, E- and LD-PIN in trillion USD (Note that monetary values have been adjusted to year-2013 values, using
the GDP-deflator [29]. Different PIN components do not sum up to the total PIN volume because the extraction of the largest
strongly connected component after application of the edge threshold.), volume fractions fV as of the total PIN, number of nodes
N, number of edges M, edge density ρ , algebraic connectivity λ1 and λ2 ≥ λ1, fractions of nodes f λsmall contained in the smaller
partition of the Fiedler graph bi-section and the corresponding cut depths Dλcut of Fiedler graph bi-sections.
year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
V TOT 18.7 19.9 26.8 31.7 33.6 41.1 45.8 32.8 37.5 38.4 35.3
V E 8.4 7.6 10.7 13.0 14.9 19.1 21.6 11.6 15.1 16.5 14.7
V LD 8.8 10.9 14.0 16.4 16.5 19.4 21.4 18.5 19.8 19.4 18.3
V SD 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.0 1.9 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.0
f EV 0.447 0.380 0.401 0.410 0.443 0.464 0.472 0.352 0.403 0.429 0.416
f LDV 0.472 0.548 0.524 0.517 0.490 0.472 0.468 0.562 0.527 0.504 0.519
f SDV 0.062 0.069 0.062 0.062 0.056 0.056 0.052 0.067 0.061 0.056 0.057
NE 49 50 56 59 67 67 70 67 71 69 69
NLD 62 62 63 66 67 66 68 67 71 72 72
NSD 54 55 56 60 59 61 64 61 67 61 63
ME 886 936 1067 1170 1333 1508 1638 1406 1533 1519 1485
MLD 1189 1178 1303 1416 1451 1583 1680 1484 1643 1684 1656
MSD 622 688 742 785 816 873 890 827 850 848 827
ρE 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.30 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32
ρLD 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32
ρSD 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.21
λE1 0.76 0.71 0.73 0.18 0.19 0.11 0.21 0.51 0.50 0.55 0.71
λE2 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.82
λLD1 0.69 0.59 0.52 0.48 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.62 0.62
λLD2 0.88 0.66 0.66 0.69 0.78 0.64 0.73 0.63 0.62 0.79 0.80
λ SD1 0.42 0.62 0.65 0.56 0.60 0.53 0.65 0.48 0.13 0.44 0.62
λ SD2 0.67 0.62 0.65 0.67 0.69 0.61 0.75 0.48 0.55 0.48 0.65
f λ ,Esmall 0.37 0.34 0.43 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.24 0.23 0.35 0.43
f λ ,LDsmall 0.44 0.48 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.45 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.44
f λ ,SDsmall 0.22 0.27 0.34 0.42 0.31 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.04 0.41 0.40
Dλ ,Ecut 0.79 0.75 0.75 0.30 0.38 0.32 0.45 1.41 1.66 1.12 0.70
Dλ ,LDcut 0.76 0.80 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.69 0.80 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.79
Dλ ,SDcut 1.59 1.29 1.05 0.72 1.08 0.93 1.03 0.52 0.54 0.43 0.81
Table S-2: PIN statistics.
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S-4: Cumulative Edge Weight Distributions
The edge weight distributions of the E- and LD-PIN are both strongly right-skewed and can be classified as heavy-tailed. Global
characteristics, like the total range of covered values, are similar for both networks, spanning four orders of magnitude in edge
weights and three orders in probability. There are, however, differences in the shapes of distributions. The edge weight dis-
tribution of the E-PIN drops faster than the one of the LD-PIN for small weights, while the opposite is true for large weights.
In accordance with the results from node strength and eigenvector centrality, this emphasises the more pronounced hierarchical
structure of the E-PIN, as compared to the LD-PIN. Moreover, overall edge weights in the E-PIN are found to be largest prior to
the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC’08), which is in agreement with the strong increase of the network’s volume at that time.
Figure S-1: Cumulative edge weight distributions. a: E-PIN. b: LD-PIN.
S-5: Cross-border Portfolio Investment and International Trade
International trade volume is a main macroeconomic indicator for the state of the world economy. We compare the total volumes
of international trade flows [37] between CPIS [18] reporting countries and portfolio investment positions (a) and effective flows
(b) for the E-PIN and the LD-PIN, where trade data are available for all CPIS reporters, except Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey and
Kosovo. Effective flows here means the difference between consecutive investment positions between two countries, but does
not necessarily imply a cash flow. This is especially thought to be true for the 2008 peak in equity flows (b), which is associated
with a global drop in stock markets during the GFC’08 (see Fig. 1-a), rather than a large amount of cross-border transactions.
Portfolio investment positions and trade flows are of the same order in magnitude, while investment positions are, on average,
a factor 1.4 larger than trade flows on the given time span. By comparing (a) and (b), one can see that start-of-year investment
positions are much better indicators than investment flows for the total volume of trade flows. When considering the impact of
the GFC’08 on the trade flow volume, its drastic reduction of about 30% is represented by a contraction of the E-PIN by 47%
and of the LD-PIN by 14%. Noting that the re-bounce of trade after the crisis is better matched by the E-PIN, we conclude that
its volume offers a better proxy than the LD-PIN for international trade.
Figure S-2: Cross-border portfolio investment and international trade. a: Investment positions. b: Investment flows.
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S-6: Cut Depths of PIN Random Bi-sections
We compare the average cut depths of different types of random bi-sections of the E- and the LD-PIN. For a random bi-section,
the set of nodes of either network at a specific time is divided randomly into two disjoint groups and the cut depth Dcut for edges
connecting these two groups is calculated. Three different drawing methods are used for partitioning the sets of nodes, where
one group is chosen accordingly and the other group is given by the remaining nodes: Fixed partition size containing half of the
nodes, random size between 1 and N− 1 nodes, and same partition sizes as the corresponding Fiedler bi-section (see App. S-6
and Tab. S-2).
For every year, network and drawing method, 104 hypothetical bi-sections are performed and averages are taken. The results are
summarised in Fig. S-3, where 99%-confidence intervals (CI) have been included. The cut depths of the corresponding Fiedler
bi-sections are given for reference. When cutting a network in half (balanced bi-section), the expected cut depth is one because
contributions from heavy and light edges, independent of the edge weight distribution, balance each other, which is exactly what
we observe (red lines). However, when partition sizes are random, the average partition will be unbalanced and one is, on average,
more likely to cut light edges in the face of a heavily right-tailed edge weight distribution, as is the case for both PIN (see Fig. S-1).
Consequently, one expects Dcut < 1, which is again what we observe (blue lines). The characteristics of both Fiedler-like random
bi-sections (green lines) can now be explained by combining the properties of balanced and unbalanced random partitions. For
the E-PIN at the beginning and the end of the observation period, and for the LD-PIN during the whole observation period, Fiedler
bi-sections are rather balanced (see Tab. S-2), leading to approximately unit cut depths of the corresponding random partitions.
The Fiedler bi-section of the E-PIN is, however, unbalanced for the middle of the observation period, especially during the years
2005-2008, when the average cut depth of random bi-sections is dropping accordingly.
We see now that the Fiedler bi-sections (black lines), which minimise the cut ratio approximatively, are significantly different from
all random partitions, indicating their ability to identify efficient bi-sections. This, in turn, may be used to describe structural
instabilities as indicated by low values of the algebraic connectivity λ1. As described in the main text, the triple T (G) =
(λ1, f λsmall, D
λ
cut) can be used to classify the Fiedler bi-sections and, if perceived as such, also the corresponding structural
instability.
Figure S-3: Cut depths of PIN random bi-sections. a: E-PIN. b: LD-PIN.
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S-7: E-PIN Sections sλ ,Esmall
Parameter triple T (E) = (λE1 , f
λ ,E
small, D
λ ,E
cut ) for the classification of Fiedler bi-sections and lists of countries contained in the
smaller sections sλ ,Esmall for all years. The numbers in parentheses are the in- and out-degrees of each node, respectively.
year λE1 f
λ ,E
small D
λ ,E
cut countries in s
λ ,E
small
2002 0.76 0.37 0.79
Argentina (9, 3), Austria (20, 29), Belgium (21, 29), Cyprus (4, 4), Czech Republic
(8, 7), Egypt (4, 2), Finland (24, 17), France (31, 30), Germany (30, 31), Hungary
(13, 2), Iceland (3, 4), Ireland (29, 29), Italy (27, 36), Luxembourg (34, 42),
Netherlands (33, 33), Poland (15, 1), Spain (28, 22), Switzerland (27, 35)
2003 0.71 0.34 0.75
Austria (18, 28), Belgium (24, 31), Chile (7, 4), Czech Republic (10, 7), Egypt (4, 1),
Finland (25, 19), France (33, 34), Germany (31, 32), Hungary (16, 2), Ireland (31,
33), Italy (29, 40), Luxembourg (36, 41), Macao (1, 6), Netherlands (32, 36),
Portugal (19, 18), Spain (27, 21), Switzerland (29, 36)
2004 0.73 0.43 0.75
Argentina (7, 7), Austria (21, 34), Barbados (1, 3), Belgium (23, 38), Brazil (26, 13),
Czech Republic (16, 9), Denmark (21, 37), France (34, 41), Germany (35, 39),
Greece (22, 11), Hungary (16, 2), Iceland (3, 8), Ireland (33, 38), Italy (27, 41),
Jersey (15, 36), Lebanon (1, 4), Luxembourg (41, 47), Macao (1, 8), Netherlands (34,
42), Poland (17, 1), Portugal (21, 20), Slovak Republic (2, 2), Spain (26, 23),
Uruguay (1, 1)
2005 0.18 0.15 0.30 Bahrain (3, 8), Cayman Islands (34, 7), Cyprus (2, 5), Egypt (9, 2), Guernsey (18,
43), Kuwait (2, 11), Lebanon (3, 4), Malaysia (21, 5), Turkey (20, 1)
2006 0.19 0.13 0.38 Bahamas (18, 4), Bahrain (2, 11), Cayman Islands (38, 5), Egypt (12, 1), Kuwait (2,
13), Lebanon (4, 4), Malaysia (24, 6), Malta (3, 5), Turkey (21, 1)
2007 0.11 0.10 0.32 Bahamas (23, 3), Bahrain (4, 16), Egypt (15, 3), Kuwait (2, 16), Lebanon (4, 6),
Malta (7, 5), Sweden (33, 48)
2008 0.21 0.13 0.45 Bahamas (23, 3), Bahrain (4, 10), Cayman Islands (39, 8), Egypt (18, 4), Kuwait (4,
17), Lebanon (2, 5), Malaysia (27, 18), Malta (12, 6), Turkey (26, 1)
2009 0.51 0.24 1.41
Australia (33, 39), Bahamas (18, 3), Bahrain (5, 10), Bermuda (33, 32), Cayman
Islands (42, 1), Egypt (17, 5), Isle of Man (10, 15), Kuwait (6, 16), Lebanon (5, 6),
Malaysia (26, 15), Malta (8, 4), New Zealand (12, 7), Norway (22, 45), Poland (25,
11), United Kingdom (51, 54), United States (60, 57)
2010 0.50 0.23 1.66
Bahamas (18, 4), Bahrain (5, 8), Cayman Islands (37, 3), Egypt (17, 5), Gibraltar (3,
4), Guernsey (26, 52), Iceland (4, 14), Isle of Man (10, 17), Jersey (32, 45), Kuwait
(6, 16), Lebanon (5, 8), Malaysia (26, 16), Malta (10, 5), Turkey (24, 2), United
Kingdom (54, 58), United States (64, 61)
2011 0.55 0.35 1.12
Australia (34, 35), Bahamas (18, 6), Bahrain (5, 6), Bulgaria (3, 4), Canada (37, 50),
Cayman Islands (40, 2), Egypt (17, 3), Gibraltar (3, 3), Guernsey (26, 53), Indonesia
(27, 1), Isle of Man (15, 18), Israel (21, 16), Jersey (30, 45), Kuwait (4, 17), Lebanon
(6, 6), Malaysia (26, 16), Malta (10, 5), New Zealand (15, 8), Panama (13, 1),
Singapore (28, 36), Slovenia (4, 14), Turkey (25, 3), United Kingdom (49, 50),
United States (64, 58)
2012 0.71 0.43 0.70
Argentina (5, 4), Australia (32, 37), Barbados (1, 10), Bermuda (36, 27), Brazil (31,
18), Bulgaria (3, 4), Canada (38, 47), Cayman Islands (43, 3), Chile (16, 12),
Colombia (14, 7), Denmark (25, 46), Greece (18, 14), Guernsey (27, 51), Hong Kong
(33, 27), Iceland (3, 14), Indonesia (25, 1), Isle of Man (14, 20), Israel (19, 16), Japan
(31, 46), Malaysia (26, 15), Mexico (21, 4), New Zealand (15, 13), Panama (14, 1),
Singapore (27, 32), South Africa (24, 22), South Korea (24, 37), Switzerland (41,
48), United Kingdom (50, 56), United States (65, 58), Uruguay (1, 2)
Tab. S-3: E-PIN section sλ ,Esmall.
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S-8: Threshold Dependence of Financial Crises Indicators
Edge threshold (eth) dependence of PIN network size by the number of nodes N (a: LD-PIN, b: E-PIN) and the two indicators
for financial crises (c: λE1 , d: ρ
LD). Dashed lines indicate the used edge threshold epth = 52million USD, which was set according
to the percolation properties of the LD-PIN (a): Above epth, most instances of the LD-PIN disintegrate rapidly.
Network connectivity at this value of the edge threshold is believed to contribute dominantly to the global properties of the
LD-PIN, at the same time rendering relative changes comparable over time. The closest coherence between the edge density and
the spread of financial derivative products is observed around this threshold value, as shown in Fig. 1-b, whereas far away from
epth there are qualitative changes in the evolution of ρ
LD (d). The shaded regions in panels (b) and (d) indicate the range of the
edge threshold eth = 25−55million USD within which the non-linear short-term memory model (2) achieves a good description
for the market values of certain financial derivative products, such as CDS, ELD and CLD.
The disintegration process of the E-PIN for rising edge thresholds is smoother and one does not observe a universal percolation
threshold. On the other hand, there is almost no qualitative change in the temporal evolution of the algebraic connectivity λE1
for a large range of values of eth: between 1-100million USD, it follows approximately the same patterns, while for values
above 100-200million USD there is a sudden jump to values around 0.7, which can be explained through the removal of network
configurations with a low cut-ratio.
Figure S-4: Threshold dependence of PIN sizes and financial crises indicators. a and c: E-PIN. b and d: LD-PIN.
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S-9: Basic Properties of the SD-PIN
In the short-term debt securities (SD) PIN, edges are aggregated cross-border positions of debt instruments which are payable
on demand or with a maturity of up to one year, including treasury bills, negotiable certificates of deposit, commercial paper,
and bankers’ acceptances [18, 43]. The SD-PIN is generated in the same way as the other PIN, namely by extracting the largest
strongly-connected component of a threshold graph (see Methodology). Because the total volume of SD-securities and the size
of positions is generally one order of magnitude smaller than those of E- and LD-investments (see Tab. S-2), the edge threshold
here has been set to 10% of that of the E- and LD-PIN, or eth = 5.5million USD. Basic properties of the SD-PIN are summarised
in Tab. S-2 and Fig. S-5. Besides its smaller volume, the biggest difference with respect to the other PIN is the SD-PIN’s lower
edge density, which is about ρSD = 0.2, i.e. about 0.1 lower than those of the E- and LD-PIN. This may, however, be related to
the larger number of unavailable data within this statistic.
The SD-PIN shows mixed characteristics of the other two PIN. Its edge weight distribution (Fig. S-5-a) resembles in shape that
of the E-PIN (Fig. S-1-a), while its node strength (Fig. S-5-b) and eigenvector centrality (Fig. S-5-c) distributions are similar
to those of the LD-PIN (Figs. 2-b and -d). The SD-PIN has a pronounced hierarchical structure, as all PIN do, but there is no
dominating node, as for the E-PIN where the US is the most central country by far.
The temporal evolution of the numbers of nodes N and edges M and the resulting edge density ρSD are shown in Fig. S-5-d. The
most prominent feature here is the drop in edge density in 2010, which is caused by a considerable increase in the number of
nodes. We use the proposed methodology to investigate this phenomenon, looking for specific topological changes at that time.
To do so, we consider the Fiedler graph bi-section in combination with the parameter triple T (SD) (see App. S-6). The temporal
evolution of the algebraic connectivity λ SD1 is shown in Fig. S-5-e, while those of the cut depth D
λ ,SD
cut and the fraction of nodes
f λ ,LDsmall contained in the smaller sections are given in Fig. S-5-f. According to T (SD), the drop in edge density was accompanied
with the emergence of a sparsely connected and very small group of countries, namely Bahrain, Bermuda and Kuwait. Note
that these are exactly the three nodes most-associated with the steep drop of λE1 of the E-PIN in 2005 (see Tab. 1). This result
underpins the findings from the E-PIN and further demonstrates the applicability of the new concepts.
Figure S-5: Basic properties of the SD-PIN. a: Cumulative edge weight distribution. b: Cumulative node strength distribution.
c: Cumulative eigenvector centrality distribution. d: Temporal evolution of the number of nodes N, the number of edges M and
the resulting edge density ρSD with reverence to their year-2002 values. e: Spectral stability indicators λ1, λ2 and ∆λ = λ2−λ1.
f: Cut depth of the Fiedler bi-section, where the numbers indicate the fractions of nodes contained in the smaller sections sλ ,LDsmall .
22
